Damages: Limitations in Recovery on Lost Profits in Indiana by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 8
Fall 1955
Damages: Limitations in Recovery on Lost Profits
in Indiana
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1955) "Damages: Limitations in Recovery on Lost Profits in Indiana," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 31: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol31/iss1/8
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
DAMAGES: LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY OF LOST
PROFITS IN INDIANA
Loss of profit is a recognized element of compensable harm.' The
process by which a court determines whether such a claim is com-
pensable is not unlike that followed in deciding all claims for damages.2
It must be established that the interest existed in the plaintiff3 and that
invasion of the interest was foreseeable;4 finally, the loss suffered must
be translated into damages.
The determination of the amount of damages was, and is today, to
a large extent, peculiarly within the province of the jury.5 The formula-
1. For specific instances in which the interest has been recognized, See McCoR-
MIcK, DAMAGES §§ 123-26 (1935).
2. In tort: See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE C. 1 (1927). In con-
tract: See Id. c. 2; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1006-19 (1951).
3. "[Interests] include all those rights of personality, rights of property and rights
of economic advantage and opportunity." GREEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4. The range
of difficulty encountered in establishing the interest varies. The plaintiff's interest in
being free from physical damage to person or property is assumed. In such cases, the
only remaining question is that of liability and damages. Id. at 5. However, the in-
terest may be intangible so as to depend for legal recognition upon the existence of an
observable fact, e.g., the traumatic injury required for recovery when mental anguish
is negligently caused. See Note, 15 IND. L.J. 239 (1940). Legal recognition of rights
of economic advantage may depend upon proof of a number of factors from which
a court is willing to assume that the interest asserted to have been invaded actually
existed. See Eagle Lake Ice Co. v. Munson, 73 Ind. App. 496, 127 N.E. 839 (1920).
In these cases the courts attempt to preserve the integrity of their function by predi-
cating liability only upon the existence of a sufficiently proved damage. See 1 STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 475 (1906).
4. Subsumed under this determination are the problems of right-duty, violation of
duty, and causal relation as set forth by GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY C. 2 (1930). See also
Note, 29 IND. L.J. 622 (1954). The analogous determination in contract cases proceeds
from the principle announced in Hadley v. Baxendale, 3 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 330 (1932) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1007-09
(1951). For a judicial exposition of the principles involved, See Coy v. Indianapolis
Gas Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N.E. 17 (1897) (tort) ; Indiana, B. & W. Ry. v. Adamson,
114 Ind. 282, 15 N.E. 5 (1887) (contract). See note 11 infra.
5. In the area of damages for injuries to the person there is virtually no control
of the jury's discretion. See Consolidated Stone Co. v. Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 337-38,
73 N.E. 695, 697-98 (1905). Very little can be known of the exercise of power by trial
judges over the amount of damages, but some indication of the possible control is in-
dicated by the standards which appellate courts use in reviewing the amount of damages
awarded. In appeals taken for inadequacy of damages a court will, apparently, indulge
any presumption necessary to affirm. See Henschen v. New York Cent. R.R., 223 Ind.
393, 400-02, 60 N.E.2d 739, 740-41 (1945) (wrongful death); Spannuth v. Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. Ry., 196 Ind. 379, 382, 148 N.E. 410, 411 (1925) (personal injury);
Klenke v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 83 Ind. App. 478,. 481, 149 N.E. 103, 104 (1925)
(wrongful death). But see IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-2406 (Burns 1946). The standards
stated for reversal in appeals for excessive damages may be summarized as passion,
prejudice, or corruption; outrageous at first blush; and an improper element of damages
included in an instruction. See, e.g., Samuel E. Pentecost Const. Co. v. O'Donnell, 112
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tion of a law of damages,6 however, has resulted in an increased control
by courts over the jury's discretion. Injury to property interests, be-
cause of the existence of values' with which a court has familiarity in-
dependent of a record, is most susceptible to judicial control and repre-
sents the most fully developed area in the law of damages.' The rules
applicable to the measurement of damages for invasions of property in-
terests are stated in terms of market value. The existence of these nor-
mal rules lays the basis for distinction between general and special in-
jury.9 It is to the damages granted for special injury that the require-
Ind. App. 47, 62, 39 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1942) ; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Stierwalt, 87 Ind.
App. 478, 493-94, 153 N.E. 807, 812 (1927); Illinois Central R.R. v. Cheek, 152 Ind.
663, 678, 53 N.E. 641, 646 (1899) ; Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 186, 183 N.E. 312,
318 (1932). As a practical matter it appears that a judgment claimed to be excessive
will not be reversed unless the evidence establishes that there was no reasonable basis
for the award. See Pixley v. Catey, 102 Ind. App. 213, 1 N.E.2d 658 (1936).
6. The law of damages is a by-product of the control which judges have developed
over juries. McCoR[IcK, DAMAGES § 6 (1935). "[T]he whole development of the
common law system was hampered and retarded for want of some simple and effective
means of controlling the jury. Apparently it was equity which, by granting relief
against unjust verdicts, forced the Courts of the common law to remedy the defect.
And of all the ways -in which equity might have intervened, the one chosen was to grant
a fresh trial at law." Washington, Damages in Conitract at Coinin Law,-47 L.Q. Rv.
345, 358 (1931). See also ScotT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN AcrIoNs AT LAw
c. 4 (1922).
7. The law of damages for the invasion of property interests is oriented around
the concept of market value. Market value, though often referred to in opinions as
representing an immutably recorded worth, is legal shorthand for that amount of
money which a commodity would bring when sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer.
Only in the rare cases where a commodity exchange exists is the fiction of "handy
reference" efficacious. See McCO IcK, DAMAGES §§ 44-45 (1935). The limits of the
concept and its strength are illustrated in cases where personal effects are converted
and courts justify resorting to a compensatory measure of damages because of the
absence of a market value. See Aufderheide v. Fulk, 64 Ind. App. 149, 112 N.E. 399
(1916).
8. Washington suggests that the growth of commerce in the eighteenth century led
courts to develop the requirement of certainty in order to make the measurement of
damages in contract cases uniform. Washington, supra note 6 at 364-65. The illustra-
tions he uses tend to support the broader generalization that the certainty requirement
was applied throughout the range of property interests as well. Application of the
market value concept would aid this advance. See note 38 infra.
9. Damages not measurable by the use of a normal rule, e.g., the difference be-
tween contract price and market value, are special damages. This label subjects a plain-
tiff to the requirement that special damage be pleaded with particularity in order to
give a defendant notice of the claim against which he must defend. See Loesch v.
Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 41 N.E. 326 (1896), rehearing, 43 N.E. 129 (1896). The prob-
lem in recovering for "special" damage is largely one of overcoming the application
of a normal rule to measure loss. Of terms such as "direct," "indirect," "immediate,"
and "consequential," Corbin suggests that "their constant use shows two things: First,
that legal responsibility for injuries has a limit. Secondly, that this limit can not be so
described in words as to be capable of mechanical application; much must be left to
the judgment, and even to the emotions, of the trial court and jury." 5 CoRRiN, CoN-
mhcCs § 998 (1951).
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ment of certainty of proof of amount has meaningful application."0
Since the certainty of amount requirement is practicable only as a
standard for review, it is possible that its literal application may result in
a denial of damages for an element of damage determined to have been
prima facie compensable under a foreseeability test." There are two
equally desirable goals: evidence from which a jury can determine the
amount of damages and full compensation for injury suffered. Since
there are a great number of cases in which the problem arises, often with
no consistency between cases, patterns can be found only in the analysis
of many cases within a single jurisdiction.
Prior to the recognition in this state of the certainty of amount
requirement,12 judicial review of the grant of damages for loss of profit
10. It is frequently asserted that in an earlier period both English and American
courts denied a recovery of lost profits. 1 SEDGWiCK, DAMAGES § 175 (9th ed. 1920).
In Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718 (1858), a leading case on recovery
of lost profits, the early view was modified so as to recognize that lost profits might
be recovered if their amount could be proved with some degree of certainty. In the
opinion Judge Seldin went to great lengths to distinguish the certainty of amount re-
quirement, which he announced, from the certainty of responsibility requirement sug-
gested by Pothier and enunciated in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 3 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Id. at 493, 69 Am. Dec. at 721. See Washington, Damages in
Contract at Common Law, 48 L. Q. REv. 90, 103-04 (1932). In the words of Judge
Seldin, "the party injured is entitled to recover . . . gains prevented as well as losses
sustained; and this rule is subject to but two conditions: The damages must be such
as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when
they made the contract . . . and they must be certain, both in their nature and in
respect to the cause from which they proceed." Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 494-95,
69 Am. Dec. 718, 722-23 (1858). Whether or not the maritime cases, usually cited for
the proposition that the early law did not compensate for lost profits, can be distin-
guished from the cases leading to the principle of remoteness announced in Hadley's
case is a moot question in view of the favor which the requirement of certain proof has
found in present law. It is, nonetheless, interesting to compare the early maritime cases
with later cases in which the same problem was resolved differently because lost profits
could not fairly be said to be remote. Compare The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546 (U.S.
1818), with Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101 (U.S. 1851).
11. It has been suggested that there is no significance in distinguishing between
"fact of loss" and "amount of loss" because proof of one necessarily establishes the
other. Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 194, 196 (1932). While this is no doubt true, compen-
sation does not result to the plaintiff by having proved the minimum amount of loss
required to establish a cause of action. Doddridge v. American Trust & Savings Bank,
98 Ind. App. 324, 342, 189 N.E. 165, 168 (1934). Proof of the fact of loss is proof of
the interest allegedly invaded and of the defendant's responsibility for the invasion.
After a trial judge has made a determination of these facts in favor of the plaintiff it
is doubtful that he would be inclined to rule that the same evidence is too uncertain to
measure the amount of damages. It would seem to follow that it is appellate courts
which make meaningful the requirement that damages be proved with certainty. The
implication of this requirment is that, regardless of the certainty of the fact of damage,
there can be compensatory damages only in the amount proved with certainty. Dod-
dridge v. American Trust & Savings Bank, supra. Insofar as the evidentiary require-
ments of proof of amount exceed what is required to prove the fact of damage, the
certainty requirement provides opportunity for frustration of the effectiveness of the
damages remedy. See Note, 15 IND. L.J. 237 (1939).
12. See note 10 supra.
NOTES
was largely limited to the determination of questions of liability. This
is a question of foreseeability of the injury. The principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale" was used in cases of breach of contract, and, in tort, the
analogous test of proximate cause or unreasonable risk was employed. 4
The case of Shelbyville L.B.R.R. v. Lewark"5 illustrates the review
process under this approach. There a wagon with which plaintiff con-
ducted a freight-hauling business was negligently damaged. The Su-
preme Court affirmed recovery of "what the value of 'the use of the
wagon would have been to him while it was undergoing repair." " . Since
the injury was a proximate result of the defendant's negligence, it was
ruled that the loss must be compensated." Though the opinion refers to
speculative lost profits, this was apparently intended for those cases in
which the loss could not be clearly termed "immediate." The case stands
for the proposition that the measure of damages for a deprivation of
use is the "value of the use" to the injured party.
The evidentiary problems involved in establishing the value of use
were first raised in Fultz v. Vycoff."8 Damages were sought for a mis-
representation which caused a stallion to be incapacitated during the
"foal-getting" season; and, over the defendant's objection, testimony
was allowed on loss of profit for the season. 9 In affirming for the
plaintiff, the Court stated: "[T] he jury should have information of the
prospects for the season, not as the measure of damages, but as a guide
to the exercise of that discretion, which must always, to a certain extent,
rest with a jury."2  It is not apparent from the opinion in either case
above that there was evidence substantiating a potential demand for the
services which the plaintiffs proferred."
Indicative of the change in approach by the Indiana courts after
recognition of the certainty of amount requirement" are the cases of
Western Gravel Road Co. v. Cox" and Glass v. Garber.4  In the Cox
case the defendant, in a counterclaim, specified a loss of tolls as an ele-
13. 3 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See note 10 supra.
14. See cases cited, note 4 supra.
15. 4 Ind. 471 (1853).
16. Id. at 473.
17. "The principle is to indemnify the party injured-to compensate him for any
loss which is the immediate result of the wrongful act." Id. at 474 (Emphasis added.)
18. 25 Ind. 321 (1865).
19. "I think I lost, by the loss of the season, about $250." Id. at 322.
20. Id. at 326.
21. The court rejected defendant's contention that the proper measure of damages
was the cost of renting another stallion during the period of the deprivation; there was
no possibility that a similar stallion could have been rented. Id. at 325. See discussion
at pp. 146-47 infra.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. 39 Ind. 260 (1872).
24. 55 Ind. 336 (1876).
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ment of damage arising from the plaintiff's delay in completing a road
pursuant to contract. This element of damage was stricken from the
counterclaim on motion by the plaintiff, and the order was affirmed on
appeal. In view of the procedure used, evidence could not have been
introduced as to loss of tolls; and it is, therefore, difficult to agree with
the court's assumption that the trial judge had invoked a rule requiring
certainty in the proof of the amount of damages. The claim was prob-
ably stricken after the trial court had determined that it was not main-
tainable under the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale. The appellate
court's opinion ignored the question of foreseeability and discussed,
rather, the contingent nature of profits so as to infer that, by their very
nature, they are not a proper basis for the assessment of damages.
The significance of the Cox decision was obscured by the reasoning
through which the affirmance was reached;25 this confusion is com-
pounded in the Glass case. The defendant contracted to publish a notice
of plaintiff's intention to reapply for a saloon license. Because the no-
tice was not published the license was denied; plaintiff sued to recover
lost profits for the thirty day period he was forced to close.26 In re-
versing the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint,
the Supreme Court based its decision on the narrow ground that the
complaint stated a valid claim for the consideration paid for the pub-
lication. Although the plaintiff had an established business upon which
the probability of profits could have been predicated, 7 the opinion evaded
all discussion which might have served to guide the lower court on this
point in the new trial.28
25. If the effect of a determination that damage is remote is to be distinguished
from that where the damages resulting from foreseeable damage can not be proved
with the requisite certainty, it would seem thdt the former must proceed from an in-
terpretation of the contract and the latter upon the evidence adduced to support the
damages. Doddridge v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 98 Ind. App. 324, 342, 189
N.E. 165, 168 (1934). "[Iln Hadley's Case, the Court decided that on the facts the
plaintiff was not entitled to maintain a claim for loss of profits. If it had decided that
a claim was maintainable, the problem of measuring the damages to be recovered would
still remain." Washington, supra note 10, at 105.
26. Glass v. Garber, 55 Ind. 336, 338 (1876).
27. The complaint alleged that the "business, during the thirty days, was worth
fifteen dollars per day, above expenses." Ibid.
28. "[H]e paid the appellees three dollars and a half for inserting the advertise-
ment, which was never inserted. We think he is entitled . . . to recover this amount,
at least; . . . and we think, if . . . the complainant's . . .place of business became
useless to him for a time, that it is a fair element for a jury to consider, in estimating
the damages . . . [B]ut we are of opinion that the mere problematical, uncertain, con-
tingent, vague and speculative profits, upon expected sales of liquor by retail . . . do
not constitute a proper basis upon which to assess damages." Id. at 340. Apparently,
the court was undecided as to which approach it should take. The fact of loss of profit
is clear enough to cause the court to suggest its compensability, but there is no sug-
gestion as to how it could be measured without receiving evidence of the profit actually
made.
NOTES
The last authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the
question of compensation for loss of profits and on the amount of evis
dence necessary to satisfy the certainty of proof requirement is in the
case of City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut.29  To determine the existence of
an interest in future gains, the court in this case used the criterion of an
established and profitable business."s The court concluded that when
the fact of injury to an interest is established, evidence of profits made
in the past must be considered in determining the amount of damages."'
As in the Fultz case, the court held that evidence of lost profit, while not
a measure of damages, is properly considered by a jury in estimating
the amount of the damages.
3 2
There is some indication that a court's approach in reviewing a
grant of damages for loss of profits is influenced by the nature of the
wrong causing the damage. 3 When cases involving breach of contract
are compared with tort cases, it appears that less concern is shown in the
latter toward the certainty of the evidence supporting damages. 4 Al-
though no definitive explanation for this result is apparent, among pos-
sible reasons is the opportunity of contracting parties to provide for the
contingency of default;3" tortious invasions are not susceptible of the
29. 112 Ind. 542, 13 N.E. 686 (1887).
30. "We think it clear that where there is an established business of a permanent
character . . . the net earnings of the present and past are competent to be con-
sidered by the jury in estimating the damages." Id. at 557, 13 N.E. at 693. The Glass
case was both distinguished on the ground that the profit lost was prospective and said
to be, by implication, -in accord with the result reached. Id. at 551-52, 13 N.E. at 691.
See note 25 supra; Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Hascall, 123 Ind. 502, 24 N.E. 336
(1890) (new business).
31. See note 30 supra. Proceeding from the observation that a successful business
was interrupted, the court rejected defendant's contention that, in any event, the plain-
tiff should be limited to a recovery of the rental value of the business as "a doctrine
radically wrong." City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 558-59, 13 N.E. 686,
694 (1887).
32. Id. at 559, 13 N.E. at 694.
33. Id. at 555, 13 N.E. at 692.
34. Compare Fultz v. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321 (1865) ; City of Terre Haute v. Hud-
nut, 112 Ind. 542, 13 N.E. 686 (1887) (tort), with Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFar-
Ian Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 76 N.E. 294 (1905); J. P. Smith Shoe Co. v. Curme-
Feltman Shoe Co., 71 Ind. App. 401, 118 N.E. 360 (1918) (contract). But see Niagara
Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, 77 Ind. 591 (1881) (contract). "But the truth is, probable
profits which might have been received, not remote or merely speculative, have often
been allowed in proof, not as the measure of damages, but to aid the jury in estimating
the damages." Id. at 594. See notes 35, 37 infra.
35. It might as well be said that if parties to contracts were omniscient there would
be no breaches of contract. Nevertheless, this distinction has influenced determinations
of liability. "[W]here extraordinary liabilities are to be assumed by a party . . . it
should appear that he understood the nature of the responsibility he was taking upon
himself, and . . . his compensation should include some consideration for the respon-
sibility assumed. . . . If parties desire to avail themselves of a claim to such damages,
they should expressly stipulate for them in the contract itself." Acme Cycle Co. v.
Clark, 157 Ind. 271, 278, 61 N.E. 561, 563' (1901). The contemplation of the parties test
is also subject to this narrow refinement. "The liability of the party for the extra-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
same control. Another possible explanation is that courts may measure
the risk assumed under the contract by the value of the consideration
received."0 This would tend to severely limit the damages recoverable.
The suggestion made that encouragement of business demands limited
damages 7 is hardly realistic inasmuch as the injured party is more often
than not a corporate or other business enterprise whose uncompensated
harm also represents a serious loss to the business world. The original
difference in treatment of the two types of injuries-tort and contract-
seems to have disappeared in later cases."8 At the same time the degree
of certainty required to support recoveries in the contract cases seems to
vary; reasons for this variance are often suggested by factual differences
in the cases.
In a case 9 in which the damage was foreseeable but in which there
was neither an established business nor a basis for estimating profit from
the past,4" a jury was allowed to make an estimate of loss. It does not
appear what evidence entered into the determination although the court
seemed to indicate that, when the fact of damage is clear, the best evi-
dence which, the plaintiff can provide will be admissible in proving dam-
ages." Allusion is frequently made in such a case to the propriety of
ordinary damages . . . should be so plainly understood as to render it one of the
terms of the contract." Ibid. A tendency to limit the damages recoverable for breach
of contract is also found in cases which label recoveries based upon market value rules
as legal or ordinary. See Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind.
123, 135, 76 N.E. 294, 298 (1905).
36. See note 35 supra. This view has been strongly criticized; consideration has
no necessary relation to the damages recoverable. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 996
(1951). "Assumpsit was not a natural growth; an acorn was not dropped and later
found to have become an oak. It was a man-made creation, for certain very definite
purposes ... The requirement of consideration was imposed out of an obvious neces-
sity of policy, but to make it the measure of damages would have been largely to de-
feat the object for which assumpsit was created." Washington, supra note 6, at 373.
37. "In allocating the risks of business, the promisor, who is generally the entre-
preneur, has been favored . . . If the parties wish to make some other arrangement,
it is open to them to do so; otherwise, in these mercantile transactions, it is often the
part of wisdom to sacrifice consistency and theory in favour of definiteness and
expediency." Washington, sapra. note 10, at 97. See note 8 szupra.
38. See Weddle v. I.R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 85 N.E2d
501 (1949) (negligence); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Barker, 110 Ind. App. 648, 40 N.E.2d
348 (1941) (breach of warranty) ; Weisman Motor Sales, Inc. v. Allen, 106 Ind. App.
284, 19 N.E. 2d 505 (1938) (contract).
39. Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Hascall, 123 Ind. 502, 24 N.E. 336 (1890).
Defendant built a hotel and contracted with the plaintiff to furnish it for occupancy by
a specified date. To an action for the cost of the furniture, defendant entered a
counterclaim for lost profits during a period of delays prior to performance. Id. at 503,
24 N.E. at 337.
40. The rental value of the hotel for the period subsequent to the loss was alleged.
Ibid.
41. Ibid. See also Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, 77 Ind. 591 (1881); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347, 355-56 (1882). In the latter case it was held that
damages could be based upon the probabilities that insurance policies sold by the plain-
NOTES
allowing the jury discretion in assessing damages."
A claim for loss of use of production facilities alleged to have re-
sulted from breach of contract presents the problem of recovering lost
profits in its most difficult aspect. In Acme Cycle Co. v. Clark43 an
order sustaining a demurrer to a counterclaim for lost profits was af-
firmed because it was not shown that, if the machinery had been de-
livered according to contract terms, the claimant would have been in a
position to put it to use. The case was, clearly, not one in which the
amount of lost profits could be an issue, and the court's statement of
the requirement of certain proof is not necessary to the holding.44
In Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlane Carriage Co.,45 however,
the plaintiff recovered a judgment for loss of use of production facili-
ties." In reversing, the Supreme Court decided that the admission of
evidence of lost profit was error.47 This was accomplished by a holding
that the loss was not a "direct"4 8 result of the breach and that, in any
event, lost profits are not a proper basis upon which to determine value
of use.4" Since the loss was held to be unforeseeable, reference to the
measure of damages for deprivation of use was, again, unnecessary.
tiff would remain in force and that premiums would continue to be paid. "Certainty
is not attainable, but this may be said of all kindred questions. Because absolute cer-
tainty is not attainable is no reason for rejecting all claims to recovery. If certainty
were to be taken as the criterion, there would be few cases indeed where there, could
be any recovery at all." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, supra. In Cleveland, C.C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Woodbury Glass Co., 80 Ind. App. 298, 120 N.E. 426 (1918), the certainty
requirement was departed from in favor of "some evidence to sustain the amount of
damages assessed." Id. at 314, 120 N.E. at 432. Contra, Indianapolis Rys. v. Terminal
Motor Inn, Inc., 112 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. App. 1953).
42. Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Hascall, 123 Ind. 502, 510, 24 N.E. 336, 339
(1890). See Fultz v. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321, 326 (1865) ; City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut,
112 Ind. 542, 557, 13 N.E. 686, 693-94 (1887).
43. 157 Ind. 271, 61 N.E. 561 (1901).
44. "Here there was no outlay, no deprivation of-the use of property, no loss upon
contracts previously entered into. . . . The only damages alleged to have been sus-
tained . . . consisted in the loss of future, contingent, speculative, and imaginary
profits." Id. at 278, 61 N.E. at 563. This is a determination that plaintiff had no in-
terest in future gains from the performance of the contract. See note 3 supra.
45. 166 Ind. 123, 76 N.E. 294 (1905).
46. Unlike the facts of the Clark case, the plaintiff alleged the availability of
other parts necessary to produce, employee and plant capacity, and orders from solvent
customers for full production. Id. at 127, 76 N.E. at 295.
47. Id. at 135, 76 N.E. at 298.
48. Professor Corbin has fittingly characterized the test of natural consequence
as "probably the most commonly used verbal justification of decisions already arrived
at." 5 CoRniN, CONTRACTS 75 (1951). See note 51 infra.
49. The court did not, however, justify this on its determination that the loss was
unforeseeable, i.e., remote. "[B]ecause of the uncertainty of future profits and be-
cause the risks of the business should rest upon the owner thereof, the value of the use
should be regarded as the basis for a recovery, where a case is made for the allowance
of special damages growing out of a deprivation of the use of property." Connersville
Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 136, 76 N.E. 294, 299 (1905).
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This dictum is contrary to the cases heretofore considered,50 and this
fact, along with the formulistic reasoning which led to the determination
of unforeseeability,5 1 deprives the case of value as precedent. Since this
is the Supreme Court's last pronouncement on the subject, the answer to
questions concerning the recognition of an interest in lost profits and
the factors which properly enter into a determination of damages for
such a loss must be found either in the line of cases culminating in City
of Terre Haute v. Hudnut or in the later cases decided by the Appellate
Court.
A breach of a construction contract or an agreement for the pur-
chase of unascertained goods raises the problem of lost profits for the
contractor or manufacturer.52 The requirement of certainty was con-
sidered with respect to proof of profits lost by a manufacturer in W. J.
Holliday & Co. v. Highland Iron & Steel Co.5" The violated contract
contained options which defendant might have exercised in fulfilling its
obligation to order and submit specifications for bar iron. Defendant
predicated its argument as to uncertainty upon the varying prices of the
iron during the option period, the varying sizes at different production
costs which might have been ordered, and the fact that plaintiff had not
shown the cost of manufacturing his products. 4 The court rejected
these contentions with the observation that "if the vendor can make his
goods for less than the market price, he is entitled to his actual profit."5
Though the loss of profit was probable, the evidence could not have
established its amount with any degree of certainty." The recitation
50. See note 42 supra.
51. "Whether . .. [plaintiff] brought itself within [the rule of the Hadley case]
we shall not inquire." Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123,
136, 76 N.E. 294, 299 (1905). "[Alnd, finally, a measure of damages (the difference
between contract and market price of the wheels not delivered) can in any event be
applied which is substantial in its character and sufficient to cover all natural or
proximate results of the breach." Id. at 135, 76 N.E. at 298. It is submitted that the
substantiality of an inapplicable measure of damages should have no bearing upon the
right to recover special damages. See note 25 supra.
52. The amount ordinarily recoverable is the difference between the contract price
and cost of constructing or manufacturing. Dunn v. Johnson, 33 Ind. 54, 59 (1870) ;
Richter v. Meyers, 5 Ind. App. 33, 34, 31 N.E. 582, 583 (1892) ; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 346(2) (1932).
53. 43 Ind. App. 342, 87 N.E. 249 (1909).
54. Id. at 351, 87 N.E. at 251.
55. Ibid.
56. The court suggests that where the specific goods to be manufactured are un-
known, sufficient certainty is found by looking to the ordinary course of the manu-
facturer's business; and, as to variations of price with time, the cost least injurious to
the one having the option should be used. Further considerations in his favor, it is
suggested, must be shown by the defendant. Id. at 354-55, 87 N.E. at 252-53. Cf. Mad-
•dox v. Yocum, 114 Ind. App. 390, 398, 52 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1944) (evidence of profit
-within knowledge of defendant). Compare Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. Ry. v. Lutes, 112
Jnd. 276, 11 N.E. 784 (1887), rehearing, Id. at 284, 14 N.E. 706 (certainty question held
NOTES
of the requirement of certainty in these cases is merely an attempt at
logical consistency.
In the breach of a sale contract by the seller the ordinary measure
of damages is the difference between market value and contract price
of the goods at the time of the breach.58 Like all rules based upon
market value, there is an assumption that this amount will enable the
damaged party to procure a substituted performance." But when the
property can not be replaced, losses will depend upon the uses which were
to have been made of it; the amount of the recovery then depends upon
the foreseeability of the loss. In J. P. Smith Shoe Co. v. Curme-Felt-
man Shoe Co.6" the recovery was the difference between retail and contract
price of shoes which the defendant failed to deliver."' In the course of
the opinion the court, quoting with approval from an Oregon case,62
states: "The rule that damages which are uncertain or contingent cannot
be recovered . . . applies to such damages as are not the certain result
of the breach, and not to such as are the certain result but uncertain in
amount."6 3 This is a refutation of the certainty of amount requirement
and of the reasoning process which it embodies.64 Plaintiff was deprived
of the opportunity of making a profit on the sale of shoes. The
difference between this loss and a total interruption of a business or the
frustration of an expansion is one of degree only. There seems to be no
reason why the same approach should not be applicable to all such cases.
In Weddle v. I.R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp.,6 5 plaintiff sought dam-
ages resulting from negligent injury to a tractor and trailor. The al-
waived), with Weddle v. I.R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 85 N.E.2d
501 (1949) (certainty considered despite appellant's failure to properly raise question).
57. Though the requirement of certain proof of the amount of damages is generally
considered a part of plaintiff's case, the burden of disproving a presumed amount may
be shifted to the defendant. See note 56 sapra; Dunn v. Johnson, 33 Ind. 54, 63 (1870).
See also Weisman Motor Sales, Inc. v. Allen, 106 Ind. App. 284, 19 N.E.2d 505 (1938);
McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 27 (1935).
58. Kent v. Gintner, 23 Ind. 1 (1864); Rahm v. Deig, 121 Ind. 283, 23 N.E. 141
(1889).
59. Washington, supra note 10, at 97; McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 44 (1935).
60. 71 Ind. App. 401, 118 N.E. 360 (1918).
61. Id. at 438, 118 N.E. at 369.
62. Blagen v. Thompson, 23 Ore. 239, 31 Pac. 647 (1893).
63. J. P. Smith Shoe Co. v. Curme-Feltman Shoe Co., 71 Ind. App. 401, 432-33,
118 N.E. 360, 367 (1918).
64. But cf. Eagle Lake Ice Co. v. Munson, 73 Ind. App. 496, 127 N.E. 839 (1920).
The court reversed a judgment for damages allegedly resulting from defendant's failure
to deliver ice. Plaintiff claimed a loss of profits resulted from his consequent inability
to make ice deliveries at the customary early hour. The court suggested that the cer-
tainty requirement would have been met if there had been evidence: of definite contracts
of sale for a definite period; that the customers were lost solely by reason of the
plaintiff's -inability to deliver ice at an early hour; that the customers were solvent; and
that the customers continued to reside in the city. Id. at 499-500, 127 N.E. at 840.
65. 119 Ind. App. 354, 85 N.E.2d 501 (1949).
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pellate court disallowed a recovery of the value of the use during the
period in which repairs were being made on the ground that value of use
is a proper measure of damages only when property has no rental value.6
The court also stated that net profit, when ascertainable with reasonable
certainty, is an alternative measure of damages for value of use. 7 This
departure from local precedent is traceable to a South Carolina case6 s
in which rental value was used synonomously with the Indiana con-
cept of value of use. The South Carolina court admitted evidence of lost
profit to establish rental value. 9 It is, however, confusing to use rental
value in this way."0 Rental value is a proper measure of damages for
deprivation of use only where there is a duty on the part of the injured
party to mitigate by renting substitute property7 or where a claim is
based upon the cost of a rental made pursuant to mitigation." In either
context, it is a modification of market value and is coextensive with
66. "[T]here is no evidence whatever as to the rental value of the [plaintiff's]
tractor-trailer nor is there any evidence that it had none." Id. at 359, 85 N.E.2d at 503.
"'[I]n cases involving the deprivation of the use of property, the damage is its rental
value, if it has a rental value, but, if not, then the value of its use is the measure of
damages.'" Ibid., quoting Fisher v. Carey, 67 Ind. App. 438, 119 N.E. 376 (1918). See
note 67 infra.
67. Weddle v. I.R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 359, 85 N.E.2d
501, 503 (1949). The court drew this conclusion from the case of Maddox v. Yocum,
114 Ind. App. 390, 52 N.E.2d 636 (1944), in which the court, while purporting to follow
the Hudnut case, equated rental value with lost profits but used lost profits as the
measure of damages. Clearly, the court, in equating rental value and lost profits, did
not fully consider the authorities -it used. Rental value was emphatically rejected in the
Hudinut case. See note 31 supra. The case of New York Cent. R.R. v. Reidenbach, 71
Ind. App. 390, 125 N.E. 55 (1919) illustrates an appropriate use of the rental value
measure. In that case the plaintiff's loss was only rental value because similar equip-
ment could have been rented. Thus, no loss of profit could be attributed to the de-
fendant's negligent destruction of the equipment. Cf. Acme Cycle Co. v. Clark, supra
note 44.
68. Standard Supply Co. v. Carter, 81 S.C. 181, 62 S.E. 150 (1908). This case
was first cited in Fisher v. Carey, 67 Ind. App. 439, 119 N.E. 376 (1918), an action for
injunctive relief and damages for past and threatened malicious trespasses, and seems
unrelated to the case. Though it can only be surmised, it appears likely that damages
were given only to allow the plaintiff to recover costs from the defendant. See IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-3004 (Burns 1946) (recoveries under $5 in tort).
69. "But neither the past success, indicated by the profits, nor any other single
factor is to be taken as controlling." Standard Supply Co. v. Carter, 81 S.C. 181, 187,
62 S.E. 150, 152 (1908). See Fultz v. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321, 326 (1865) ; City of Terre
Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 559, 13 N.E. 686, 694 (1887).
70. The rental value concept is generally applied to cases of deprivation of the use
of agricultural land. Western Indiana Gravel Co. v. Opp, 121 Ind. App. 673, 99 N.E.2d
265 (1951); Oceana Oil Producers v. Portland Silo Co., 229 Ind. 656, 100 N.E.2d 895
(1951). But even in these cases an attempt is made to make this value coextensive
with value of use. Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 94 Ind. App. 155, 160, 18C
N.E. 30, 32 (1932).
71. New York Cent. R.R. v. Reidenbach, 71 Ind. App. 390, 125 N.E. 55 (1919)
See note 67 supra.
72. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. McCall, 107 Ind. App. 479, 2!
N.E.2d 253 (1940).
NOTES
value of use only if the interest invaded lay in renting the property of
which one has been deprived. 3
Prior to the Weddle decision there were no cases in Indiana holding
that value of use and lost profits are distinct measures of damages.1
4
The delineation was drawn on the assumption that lost profit can not be
considered in determining value of use. Considering its effect, as shown
in the case of IndianapoliUs Rys. v. Terminal Motor Inn, Inc.7 this result
should be reexamined."
The Indianapolis Rys. case has the distinction of presenting a clear
instance where the deprivation of use was a "direct" result of breach of
contract. In reviewing the damages, however, the Appellate Court de-
cided that, since the amount of lost profit was not certainly provable, the
damages should have been based upon rental value. The plaintiff had
leased four tracts of land on which it operated a parking lot. The busi-
ness had been in operation on two of the tracts for ten years, with two
tracts being leased in later years. The agreement for lease of the
original tracts provided that the lessor should not cancel for the purpose
of permitting another lessee to conduct the same kind of business on
the premises unless the lessor, or subsequent lessee, should make im-
provements on some part of the premises costing not less than $50,000.8
After termination the plaintiff waited a reasonable time, but no im-
provements were made. Suit was brought charging defendant' with
bad faith in terminating, and the trial court decided in favor of the
plaintiff." Evidence of profits for the preceding four years was ad-
mitted as a fact bearing upon the reasonable value of the use for the
time remaining under the lease."0
73. Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Hascall, 123 Ind. 502, 24 N.E. 336 (1890).
See note 39 supra.
74. See note 67 supra.
75. 112 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. App. 1953).
76. See notes 21, 31, 49, 67 supra.
77. Indianapolis Rys. v. Terminal Motor Inn, Inc., 112 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. App.
1953). Further, "profits derived from a business conducted on property are too specu-
lative, uncertain and remote to be considered as a basis for computing or ascertaining
the rental value of property." Id. at 600, quoting Maddox v. Yocum, 109 Ind. App. 416,
31 N.E.2d 655 (1941). But see Maddox v. Yocum, 114 Ind. App. 390, 52 N.E.2d 636
(1944) (second appeal), discussed in note 67 supra.
78. Petition to Transfer, p. 3, Indianapolis Rys. v. Terminal Motor Inn, Inc., 112
N.E.2d 596 (Ind. App. 1953).
79. See note 80 infra.
80. The rental value of the leased premises was a primary right of the plaintiff's
at the time of the breach. Assuming that the court might have affirmed but for the
estimate of total net profit allowed in evidence, it may be doubted whether or not the
jury was intelligently aided by the evidence of capacity of each lot, hourly rates of
turnover, and parking rates for 1939 through 1948. Petition to Transfer, p. 13-14,
Indianapolis Rys. v. Terminal Motor Inn, Inc., 112 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. App. 1953). More
significant, it is submitted, are the facts relating to the defendant's breach of agreement:
